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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
fllaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970738-CA 
v. : 
RAYMOND RICK LYMAN, : Priority No. 2 
IDefendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(l)(b) (1996). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was it reasonable for the jury to infer from the totality of evidence, 
including defendant's false statements to police, that he was the thief? 
1. Was it reasonable for the jury to infer from the purchase price and date 
of purchase that the fair market value of the stolen equipment exceeded $1,000.00 
on the day of the theft? The standard of review for issues 1. and 2. is the same: 
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 [1996]. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 [1996]. Theft - Classification of offenses . . . 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall 
be punishable: . . . 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 
but is less than $5,000 . . . 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is 
or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is 
less than $300. . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
defendant was originally charged with one count of theft, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1996), and five counts of lewdness, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (1996) (R. 2-7).l He was 
bound over on all six charges (R. 37). 
His motion to quash the bind-over order (R. 65-316; see also R. 320-331) was 
granted in part, and the five lewdness counts were dismissed without prejudice (R. 336-
342). The State thereafter filed an amended information alleging a single count of 
third-degree felony theft (R. 348-349).2 
Defendant was tried before a jury (R. 798-1338). At the close of the State's 
case, he moved for a dismissal or directed verdict (R. 1212-1216) which the trial court 
denied (R. 1214, 1216). 
The jury convicted defendant of third-degree felony theft (R. 665-666). The 
trial court denied defendant's motion to arrest judgment (R. 763-769; see R. 704-720, 
745-750. 758-762; see also R. 724-725, 731-742), and sentenced defendant to zero-to-
five years in prison and a $5,000.00 fine and 85% surcharge (R. 785-790). 
| Pages in the two "pleadings folders" are numbered sequentially back to front. 
Pages 365-586 are preliminary hearing and pretrial hearing transcripts that were not, 
apparently, forwarded with the record and are not, in any event, pertinent to 
defendant's appeal. 
2,1
 The State also refiled the lewdness counts, and trial is pending. 
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Defendant's prison term and fine were stayed and he was placed on probation for three 
years. IcL Terms of his probation included serving 30 days in the county jail, payment 
of a $2,000 fine, and payment of restitution in the amount of $1,257.73. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 791-792). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Background. Because of reports that someone was looking through a hole in a 
utility closet at female patrons in a fitness center tanning room, police installed 
surveillance equipment in the closet. The next day, the surveillance equipment was 
stolen, and was never recovered. 
Defendant and his wife are co-owners, with another couple, of the Lifephase 
Fitness Center (LFC) in Cedar City, Utah (R. 987-988, 1004-1005, 1218, 1236-1237). 
Defendant, a dentist practicing in Blanding, Utah, traveled to Cedar City on 
Wednesday nights to work at the LFC through Saturday nights (R. 1221-1222; see also 
R. 939, 960-961, 978, 1039, 1156). According to his wife, defendant was primarily 
responsible for regular maintenance at the center, including spackling work and the 
monthly maintenance of the furnace and sump pump in the basement utility closet4 (R. 
1220-1221, 1223, 1237; see R. 998). Indeed, of the co-owners, defendant was the one 
3
 The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) 
(citations omitted) 
4
 The utility closet is also referred to by witnesses as the "maintenance room." 
4 
who used the utility closet the most and was most familiar with its contents (R. 1264-
1265). Defendant was also the only person seen in the utility closet on the day of the 
theft (R, 1191-1193, 1204). 
$ispicious hole between utility closet and tanning room. In late March or early 
April 1996, an LFC employee noticed a 2- to 2 ^-inch-long by 1/4- to 1/2-inch-wide 
hole under an electrical outlet in the tanning room that went through the wall into the 
adjoining utility closet (R. 934-936, 947-950, 992; cL R. 1083, 1110-1111). She told a 
coworker about the hole, and also told an LFC member who was a police officer. Id^ 
The police officer informed another LFC member, Paula Douglas, who regularly used 
the tanning room and who worked as a secretary at the Cedar City Police Department 
(CCPD) (R. 1036-1037).5 At work the following morning, she reported the 
information to a police detective (R. 1037). An anonymous caller had already phoned 
the detective with concerns that someone at the fitness center was looking through the 
hole at female patrons in the tanning room (R. 1106). 
The police detective then contacted Steve Brown, co-owner of the LFC, and 
visited the LFC's basement utility closet (R. 989-990, 1107-1108). The detective 
determined that looking through the hole a person in the utility closet could see right 
into the tanning bed in the tanning room since there was no insulation in that portion of 
5
 Shortly before trial, Paula married the police detective who was assigned to and 
testified in this case (R. 1035-1036, 1059-1061). 
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the wall (R. 1109-1112, 1129). Police decided to install surveillance equipment to see 
who was looking through the hole (R. I l l 1-1112), and co-owner Steve Brown gave his 
permission (R. 992-993). The Browns left that day to visit family in Provo for the 
Easter weekend and did not return to Cedar City until Sunday night (R. 993-994). 
Defendant's wife also left town that day to visit family in Logan, and she returned late 
Monday night (R. 1253-1255). 
Friday night: police install surveillance equipment. Late Friday night, 5 April 
1996, after the LFC had closed, police installed surveillance equipment in the utility 
closet (R. 1069, 1081-1082, 1106-1120). They hid a small pinhole video camera, a 
small monitor, a VCR, a breakout box, power adapters, cords, and cables behind the 
furnace, the two water heaters, and the sump pump (R. 1068-1082, 1099-1100, 1111-
1120, 1148, 1157-1158; State's Exhibits P-1 and P-5). Police also used loose pieces of 
sheetrock and carpet remnants to conceal the equipment. IcL Someone who simply 
opened the door and turned on the light or was unfamiliar with the room would not 
have noticed the concealed equipment (R. 1096, 1100-1102, 1113-1114, 1117-1119). 
Saturday at the LFC. Saturdays are not usually very busy at the LFC (see R. 
979-980), and, because this was Easter weekend, only a small number of patrons used 
the fitness center on this particular Saturday (R. 1040-1042, 1050-1056, 1144, 1154, 
1183-1186, 1206). 
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dn Saturday morning, between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m., a female aerobics instructor 
was the first person to enter the LFC, locked the front door behind her, and worked out 
on equipment in the "cardio" room for about half an hour (R. 954-955). 
Knowing the LFC opened at 9:00 a.m., the police detective arrived at about 8:30 
a.m., entered through the front door with a key provided by Steve Brown, went 
directly to the utility closet, turned on the power strip to the surveillance equipment, 
pushed the "record" button on the VCR, heard (but did not see) someone working out 
in the "cardio" room, and left (R. 1119-1122). There was only one car in the parking 
lot when the detective departed (R. 1121). 
Sfcme time later, defendant arrived at the LFC. Defendant found the aerobics 
instructor and asked her to teach a class from 9:00 until 10:30 a.m. (R. 955-956). His 
brother-in-law who did odd jobs, college student Chris Delahunty, reached defendant 
by phone at the LFC to tell him he would be coming in to repair some carpet seams 
they had talked about (R. 1179-1180). 
(Jhris arrived at the LFC sometime between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. (R. 1181-1182). 
He found defendant in the downstairs hallway near the tanning room (R. 1183-1187). 
Chris could see from under the tanning room door that the light was on (R. 1204). 
Defendant showed Chris the carpet seams that needed to be repaired downstairs and 
suggested that Chris use carpet remnants to repair them (R. 1180-1181, 1187-1188). 
Then defendant showed Chris the carpet seams that needed to be repaired in the 
7 
aerobics room upstairs (R. 1188). Chris got his tools and began fixing the carpet seams 
downstairs (R. 1188-1189). Some time later, he spoke with defendant who was 
standing in the open doorway to the utility closet (R. 1190-1193, 1204, 1207-1209). 
While they talked, defendant went into the utility closet, appeared to look at the shelf 
and do some work with the door open, then came back out and closed the door. IdL 
Chris saw defendant off and on as he worked (R. 1188-1189). 
Around this time, a personal trainer arrived and began working with individual 
patrons in the weight room downstairs (R. 967-973). He remembers seeing the 
aerobics instructor teaching a class that morning, and seeing Chris working on carpet 
seams in the aerobics room later on (R. 970-974). Although he saw defendant at the 
front desk when he arrived (R. 969), he did not see defendant while working with 
patrons in the weight room (R. 970-971). 
Female patron arranges with defendant to use tanning room. At about 9:30 
a.m., Paula Douglas, the CCPD secretary, arrived for her regular workout (R. 1040). 
Defendant was at the front desk. IcL Paula saw Chris on his knees fixing carpet in the 
hallway when she went downstairs to the weight room (R. 1041). Paula worked out in 
the weight room for about 30 minutes. Id,. Then she went back to the front desk, 
where she waited 2 to 3 minutes until defendant came up the front stairs (R. 1042-
1044). She asked defendant how many tans she had left on her "tanning card," then 
went downstairs to the tanning room (R. 1043-1044). 
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Paula regularly used the tanning room on Saturdays (R. 1038, 1044), had agreed 
with police to use the tanning room as normal on this particular Saturday (R. 1038), 
and knew that police had put surveillance equipment in the adjoining utility closet (R. 
1039). 
Noise from the utility closet. Paula undressed, turned on the radio and fan, set 
the timer for 20 minutes, and got into the tanning bed (R. 1044-1047). About midway 
through her tanning session, she heard what she thought was a crash or a bang coming 
through the wall from the utility closet (R. 1045, 1061-1065). Paula finished her 
tanning session, dressed, and walked through the LFC to try to locate defendant (R. 
1046-1047). When she went outside, she noticed that defendant's truck, which she had 
seen in the parking lot when she arrived, was gone (R. 1048-1050). 
The aerobics instructor finished her class at about 10:30 a.m., changed her 
clothes, and went home (R. 957-958). She does not remember seeing defendant after 
her class. kL After she left, Chris began repairing carpet seams in the aerobics room 
(R. 1193-1194). 
Paula went back inside, worked out in the "cardio" room for about 30 minutes, 
and walked through the LFC again looking for defendant (R. 1054-1056). When she 
left at about 11:00 a.m., defendant's truck was not in the parking lot (R. 1056-1057). 
Defendant does some spackling. Some time after 11:00 a.m., defendant went 
into the aerobics room carrying a bucket of sheetrock compound, and asked Chris if he 
9 
could borrow his spackling knife (R. 1194-1195). About 15 minutes later, defendant 
came back to the aerobics room and returned Chris's spackling knife (R. 1195-1196; 
1206). A short time later, defendant returned again, said he was going to be gone for 
30 minutes, and asked Chris to watch the front desk (R. 1196-1197; 1201-1202). 
Shortly after defendant left, Chris's wife and young son arrived at the LFC and 
visited with him as he continued working on the carpet in the aerobics room (R. 1168-
1170). While she was there, defendant walked in and told Chris, "I'm back" (R. 1169-
1173, 1198-1199). Chris only had to help one customer while defendant was gone (R. 
1206). 
Detective returns, surveillance equipment is missing. At about 7:00 p.m. (an 
hour after closing), the police detective returned to the LFC, went to the utility closet, 
and discovered that all of the surveillance equipment was missing (R. 1121-1123). The 
detective then called the officer from whom he had obtained the equipment, his own 
supervisor, and the chief of police (1122-1124). After some discussion, they decided 
the detective should question defendant. IcL 
The plainclothes detective and a uniformed officer arrived at defendant's house 
between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. (R. 1123-1124, 1160). Defendant answered the door. 
The officers told him about the hole in the wall between the utility closet 
and the tanning room, and that surveillance equipment police had put in the utility 
closet the night before was now missing (R. 1124-1125, 1156-1157, 1161-1163). 
10 
Defendant's denials. Defendant immediately and repeatedly denied going into 
the utility closet at any time that day, and denied knowledge of any hole (R. 1125-1126, 
1156-1157, 1162). He also denied ever leaving the LFC while working that day. IcL 
Later, after the detective made a phone call, defendant admitted leaving the LFC 
several times, but continued to deny being in the utility closet (R. 1125-1126, 1162-
1164).6 Defendant consented to a search of his home and truck, but the detective and 
the uniformed officer found nothing (R. 1126, 1164-1165). 
"Why would a thief do repair work on a hole?" The police detective returned to 
the LFC at about 10:30 p.m. to look for any evidence that would identify the thief (R. 
1126-1128). He and another officer searched every room in the fitness center, but 
could not locate the equipment (R. 1133-1134). However, the detective discovered that 
the hole between the utility closet and the tanning room had been spackled with 
sheetrock compound that was still damp to the touch (R. 1128-1129). He also 
discovered a bucket in the utility closet which contained sheetrock compound that was 
still damp. IcL The police detective also found that the hole on the tanning room side 
6
 Although his trial counsel conceded in closing argument that Chris did see 
defendant in the utility closet (R. 1308-1309), counsel tried to mitigate defendant's 
denials by arguing that defendant was only in the closet "briefly" (R. 1308-1309, 
1311). Nevertheless, defendant omitted from his marshaling the fact that he was the 
only person seen in the utility closet by a witness the day of the theft, and that his 
presence there contradicted his denials to police (see Def. Br. at 2-9). When a 
defendant fails to marshal evidence in support of the verdict, this Court will decline to 
consider an insufficiency claim. State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53, n.l (Utah App. 
1996) (citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). 
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had been spackled (R. 1130-1131). A criminalist arrived a short time later and took 
photographs of the spackled hole under the outlet in the tanning room (R. 1027-1033, 
1127-1128; State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3, addendum A). LFC co-owner, Steve 
Brown, had not asked anyone to spackle the hole and did not know who had done the 
work (R. 998). Handyman Chris Delahunty, who repaired carpet at the LFC on 
Saturday, did not do any spackling work that day (R. 1175-1210). 
Getting out without being seen. No one saw defendant or anyone else leave the 
LFC through the front door with the equipment (R. 941, 958-960, 963, 971, 973, 986), 
but, according to co-owner Brown, someone familiar with the building could exit 
without being seen (R. 1001-1003). In addition to the main staircase near the front 
lobby (see R. 1040-1041, 1183-1184), there is a staircase in the "cardio" room (see R. 
1042-1043, 1046, 1185-1186), and there are two back door exits on the main floor that 
lead to the parking lot and that could be opened from the inside without a key (R. 999-
1000, 1018-1019, 1199). In addition, defendant generally had a duffel bag with him, 
including on Saturdays (R. 1181). The equipment that was stolen would fit in a duffel 
bag (R. 1098-1100). People who knew defendant would not think it odd to see him 
leave the LFC with the duffel bag (R. 1181-1182; see also R. 1193; cf R. 1201). 
Defendant's wife's testimony. Defendant's wife was the sole witness for the 
defense. She testified that she never saw a hole in the tanning room before the day of 
the theft, even though she used the tanning room 2-3 times a week, and that, if there 
12 
were a hole, she would have noticed it and fixed it (R. 1256). Her testimony that there 
was no hole was contradicted by the testimony of five other eyewitnesses (R. 934-927, 
948-949, 991-992, 1083-1084, 1109-1111). 
Defendant's wife also testified that, a week after this incident, she went to the 
utility closet to search for a hole, took the plates off both outlets, spackled around every 
corner, and put them back on (R. 1258). She further testified that a hole later 
"reappeared," and she did the same thing (R. 1258-1259). After viewing the 
photographs taken the day of the incident, she initially suggested that they depicted her 
repairs (R. 1259; see State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3). In one of the photos, the 
criminalist had put a ruler on which he had handwritten and initialed the date the photo 
was taken: "4-6-96 CCP" ("CCP" was for "Cedar City Police," the agency requesting 
the photo, R. 1030). Defendant's wife eventually conceded that, if a hole under the 
outlet was repaired on 6 April 1996, she did not know who repaired it (R. 1259-1260).7 
7
 Defendant omitted his wife's testimony from his Statement of Facts (Def. Br. 
at 2-9). See n.6, above. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The jury's verdict was based on reasonable inferences drawn from the 
totality of evidence including defendant's false statements to police, and was not based 
on speculation and conjecture. Defendant has failed to establish that the evidence and 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his 
guilt. 
Because of reports that someone was looking through a hole in the utility closet 
at female patrons in the LFC tanning room, police installed surveillance equipment in 
the closet. The next morning, a female patron arranged with defendant to use the 
tanning room. While she was in the tanning bed she heard a noise from the utility 
closet. After she left the fitness center, defendant was seen with a bucket of sheetrock 
compound and borrowed a spackling knife. Later that day, after discovering that their 
surveillance equipment was missing, police found a bucket of still-damp sheetrock 
compound in the utility closet and discovered that the hole between the two rooms had 
been spackled shut. 
When questioned by police on the evening of the theft, defendant denied 
knowing anything about a hole in the wall and repeatedly denied that he had been in the 
utility closet. But defendant was the only person seen in the utility closet on the day of 
the theft, and compelling circumstantial evidence establish that he repaired the hole. 
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Defendant also initially denied that he had ever left the fitness center that day. But he 
later admitted, and eyewitnesses testified, that he was gone at least twice. He therefore 
had the ability to obtain the sheetrock compound for the repair, and to dispose of the 
stolen equipment which was never found. In sum, reasonable inferences from the 
totality of evidence establish that defendant was the thief. 
Point II. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the fair 
market value of the items stolen exceeded $1,000.00 on the day of the theft. Although 
there was no direct evidence as to the fair market value of the surveillance equipment 
on the day it was stolen, there was undisputed evidence that its total purchase price was 
$1,257.73. Since nine of the ten items were purchased within five months of the theft, 
the jury could reasonably infer that the fair market value of the equipment exceeded the 
statutory minimum on the day of the theft. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE TOTALITY OF 
EVIDENCE ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE THIEF 
Defendant asserts that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish 
his guilt, and that the jury's verdict must have been based on speculation and conjecture 
(Def. Br. at 9-15). On the contrary, the jury's verdict was based on reasonable 
inferences drawn from the totality of evidence including defendant's false statements to 
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police. Defendant has therefore failed to establish that, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be 
drawn from it are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See Hamilton. 827 
P.2dat235. 
It is well settled that a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone. 
See State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997); State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 
126-127 (Utah 1986); State v. Rebeterano. 681 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983); State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Barlow. 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). However, when a conviction is 
based solely on circumstantial evidence, a reviewing court must determine 
(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of 
the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from 
that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience 
sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of 
guilt. 
Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). 
The elements for third-degree felony theft are: 
1. That the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; 
2. That the defendant did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; 
16 
3. That the property had a value in excess of $1,000;8 and 
4. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about April 6, 1996, in Iron County, 
State of Utah. 
(see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1996); cf elements instruction R. 655, 1271). 
Defendant focuses his insufficiency argument on element 2. listed above: 
although he concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish a theft, he argues that 
it was insufficient to establish that he was the thief (see Def. Br. at 11; R. 1306-1307). 
Defendant specifically argues that the jury had to "leap across an evidentiary 
gap" in order to conclude that he was the one who repaired the hole between the rooms 
just because he was seen with sheetrock compound and borrowed a spackling knife on 
the day the hole was repaired (Def. Br. at 12). And even if it's true he repaired the 
hole, defendant argues, such an action by a business owner "is at least as consistent 
with lawful conduct as with criminal conduct" (Def Br. at 12-13, quoting R. 338). 
Defendant also argues that the jury had to "necessarily and impermissibly leap 
across an even bigger evidentiary gap in order to conclude that the person who spackled 
the slit was the same person who stole the surveillance equipment, and that Defendant 
was that person," and that such a conclusion could be based only on speculation and 
conjecture (Def. Br. at 13). 
Defendant contests the sufficiency of evidence on this element under Point II in 
his brief (Def. Br. at 15-18). He does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence under 
elements 1. or 4. 
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On the contrary, reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the totality of the 
evidence, including defendant's false statements to police on the day of the theft (which 
defendant omitted from his Statement of Facts, see n.6 above), establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant was the thief. 
A. Reasonable inferences from the totality of evidence implicate defendant 
Since no one saw defendant steal the equipment, and since the equipment was 
never found, the jury's guilty verdict had to be based on reasonable inferences from the 
evidence. "A jury may choose which, among several reasonable inferences, to 
believe." Brown. 948 P.2d at 345 (quoting Workman. 852 P.2d at 987; but see I.C., 
below). In reviewing the totality of evidence, the following inferences have a "basis in 
logic and reasonable human experience" (Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d at 985)): 
1. The thief had at most a 10 Vi hour window of opportunity. The police 
detective turned on the power strip to the equipment and pushed the 
"record" button at approximately 8:30 a.m., and he discovered the 
equipment was missing when he returned at 7:00 p.m. that night (R. 
1119-1123). Therefore, the police surveillance equipment was stolen 
from the LFC between 8:30 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, 6 April 
1996. (Although it was not a busy day at the fitness center, several 
people, including defendant, had access to the unlocked utility closet and 
could have stolen the equipment. But a thief other than defendant would 
have had even less time to take the equipment without being detected, 
since defendant was in and out of the utility room himself at least twice 
that day (see B.l. and 2., below).) 
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2. The thief had to be familiar with the utility closet. Police who 
installed and concealed the equipment testified that it would not have been 
visible to someone who was not familiar with the closet or its contents or 
who entered for the first time (R. 1096, 1100-1102, 1113-1114, 1117-
1119). (Witness testimony was undisputed that defendant was the person 
who used the utility closet the most and was most familiar with its 
contents (R. 1220-1221, 1223, 1237, 1264-1265), and he was the only 
person seen by a witness in the utility closet on the day of the theft (R. 
1191-1193).) 
3. The thief had to move things to discover the concealed surveillance 
equipment. Even if the thief was familiar with the contents of the utility 
closet, because the equipment was well-concealed, the thief would have 
had to move carpet remnants and sheetrock scraps out of the way to 
discover it (R. 1096, 1100-1103, 1113-1114, 1117-1119, 1148, 1157-
1158). Hence, the thief had to have had a reason to move things. 
(Defendant's brother-in-law called defendant at the LFC Saturday 
morning to ask about doing carpet seam repairs (R. 1179-1180). 
Defendant suggested Chris use carpet remnants to do some of the repairs 
(R. 1180-1181, 1187). When Chris arrived, he spoke with defendant who 
was standing in the open utility closet doorway (R. 1190-1193). 
Defendant could have discovered the concealed equipment while looking 
for a piece of carpet (see R. 1119).) 
4. The thief may have been in the utility closet while a female patron was 
tanning in the adjoining room. A female patron heard a loud crash or 
bang coming from the utility closet while she was tanning (R. 1045, 1061-
1065). It is reasonable to conclude that the noise was caused by someone 
in the closet. (The female patron had asked defendant at the front desk 
about tanning before she went to the tanning room, so defendant knew 
that she was going there (R. 1042-1044).) 
5. The thief s motive for taking the surveillance equipment may have 
been to avoid being detected looking through the hole at a female patron 
in the tanning room. The existence and location of a VCR in a utility 
closet connected to a video camera aimed at a hole in the wall through 
which someone could look into the tanning room would lead any person 
who discovered the equipment to conclude its purpose (see R. 1069, 
1081-1082, 1106-1120; State's Exhibit P-5). Hence, the thief s motive 
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may have been to avoid being detected looking through the hole. 
(Defendant regularly worked in the utility closet adjacent to the tanning 
room(R. 1220-1221, 1223, 1237, 1264-1265). If he had been looking 
through the hole at naked women, he would have had a motive to remove 
the equipment to avoid detection.) 
6. Only a thief who wanted to avoid further suspicion for looking through 
the hole would have taken the time to spackle it shut. After discovering 
the theft, the police detective observed that the hole between the utility 
closet and tanning room had been spackled shut, and that the repairs were 
still damp. He also found a bucket in the utility closet that contained 
sheetrock compound that was still damp (R. 1128-1131). Therefore, the 
hole was repaired on the day of the theft. (Defendant was carrying a 
bucket of sheetrock compound and borrowed a spackling knife just before 
noon on the day of the theft (R. 1194-1196; 1206). All the other fitness 
center owners were out of town (R. 993-994, 1253-1255), and the only 
other person doing maintenance work at the center was repairing carpets, 
not spackling walls (R. 1175-1210). Defendant was in the utility closet 
more than anyone else (see 2., above). Therefore, his motive to repair 
the hole could have been to avoid further suspicion that he was looking 
through it.) 
7. The thief had to leave the fitness center to dispose of the stolen 
equipment which was never found. After discovering their equipment 
missing, police searched every room of the fitness center but never found 
it (R. 1133-1134). No one saw the thief leave with the equipment (R. 
941, 958-960, 963, 971, 973, 986). Therefore, the thief removed the 
equipment from the fitness center without being detected. (As a co-
owner, defendant was aware of a back stairway and two rear exits from 
the fitness center (see R. 999-1000, 1018-1019, 1042-1043, 1046, 1185-
1186, 1199). Removing the equipment in the duffel bag defendant 
regularly had with him at the center would not have aroused suspicion (R. 
1098-1100, 1181-1182). Defendant initially denied to police that he had 
left the LFC the day of the theft, although he later admitted leaving 
several times (R. 1125-1126, 1156-1157, 1162-1164). Eyewitnesses 
testified that defendant left and returned to the LFC at least twice (R. 
1048-1050, 1056-1057; 1196-1197, 1201-1202; 1169-1173, 1198-1199). 
He first departed, apparently without telling anyone, shortly after a female 
patron in the tanning bed heard a loud noise in the adjoining utility closet 
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(see R. 1045, 1061-1065). Defendant's truck was gone when she 
concluded her tanning session and was still gone when she left the LFC 
herself about a half an hour later (R. 1048-1050, 1056-1057). When 
defendant returned to the LFC, he was carrying a bucket of sheetrock 
compound (R. 1194-1195). About a half hour later, he departed again 
after asking someone to cover the front desk in his absence (R. 1196-
1197; 1201-1202; 1169-1173, 1198-1199). During this absence defendant 
could easily have disposed of the surveillance equipment which was never 
found.) 
All these inferences, with a "basis in logic and reasonable human experience," 
implicate defendant. But the inferences to be drawn from his false statements to police 
on the day of the theft are even more incriminating. 
B. Defendant's false statements are incriminating and further establish that he 
was the thief 
False or misleading statements are incriminating. See State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
1232, 1234-1235 (Utah 1986) (corroborating circumstances for proof of larceny include 
acts, conduct, falsehoods, or other declarations that tend to show guilt); MeCormick's 
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 271 (2d ed. 1972) (false statements "constitute] 
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt"); see also Stafford v. People, 154 
Colo. 113, 388 P.2d 774, 778 (1964) (en banc ) (fact that defendant repeatedly lied 
about his wife's disappearance was properly submitted to the jury as evidence of guilt 
and consciousness of guilt). Therefore, when added to the inferences implicating him, 
defendant's disproved denials to police help establish that he was the thief. 
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In response to questioning by police on the evening after the theft, and after they 
told him about the missing equipment and the hole between the utility closet and 
tanning room, defendant repeatedly denied ever being in the utility closet that day and 
denied knowing about the hole (R. 1125-1126, 1156-1157, 1162). 
1. Defendant was in the utility closet. Defendant's repeated denials that he was 
ever in the utility closet on the day of the theft were directly contradicted by the 
testimony of his brother-in-law, handyman Chris Delahunty. Chris testified that he 
spoke with defendant the morning of the theft near the open door of the utility closet, 
and that, while they talked, defendant entered the utility closet, looked at a shelf and 
worked in the closet with the door open, then came back out, and closed the door (R. 
1181-1193, 1204, 1208-1209; see n.6, above). 
In addition to Chris's eyewitness testimony, strong circumstantial evidence 
suggests that defendant was also in the utility closet when the female patron in the 
tanning room heard a noise coming from the closet (see R. 1043-1047, 1061, 1065). 
2. Defendant knew about the hole. Eyewitness testimony and compelling 
circumstantial evidence establish that defendant had also been in the utility closet on the 
day of the theft to repair the hole. Indeed, his repair of the hole conclusively 
establishes that he knew about it. 
Shortly after the female patron departed the fitness center, defendant was 
carrying a bucket of sheetrock compound and asking if he could borrow his brother-in-
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law's spackling knife (R. 1194-1195). The hole between the utility closet and the 
tanning room were spackled shut some time that day, and a bucket of still-damp 
sheetrock compound was found in the utility closet later that night (R. 1128-1131). 
Photographs of the spackled hole taken later that day were also admitted against 
defendant (R. 1027-1033, 1127-1128; State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3). 
If defendant had innocently patched the hole, unaware of the surveillance 
equipment in the utility closet, it would have been unreasonable for him to repeatedly 
deny ever being in the utility closet on the day the hole was patched and the equipment 
stolen. Instead, it is more reasonable to infer that defendant left the LFC shortly after 
the noise he made in the utility closet alerted the female patron in the tanning room, 
that he obtained sheetrock compound, returned, patched the hole, and left the bucket in 
the utility closet when he was through. And it is also reasonable to infer that he later 
lied to police about being in the utility closet and knowing about the hole because he 
did not want to be identified as the thief or "peeping-Tom." 
In sum, reasonable inferences from the evidence, including his false statements 
to police, establish that defendant was the thief of the surveillance equipment. 
C. Defendant has provided no reasonable alternative hypothesis 
Defendant argues that when a verdict is based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence, that evidence "must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's 
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innocence so as to leave only one reasonable conclusion, that of guilt" (Def. Br. at 10, 
citing State v. John. 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978)). 
Although recently revived by two members of this Court in State v. Layman. 
335 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah App. January 29, 1998) (Greenwood, J., and Orme, J.; 
Bench, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), petition for cert, filed. (Utah 
March 20, 1998) (No. 980150), this proposition is contrary to the weight of recent 
Utah Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals authority. 
The two most recent Utah Supreme Court decisions addressing convictions based 
solely on circumstantial evidence do not even mention "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis." See State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997), and State v. 
Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). Both opinions hold instead that when a 
prosecution is based solely on circumstantial evidence, "the role of the reviewing court 
is to determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element 
of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that 
evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each 
legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; see also State v. 
Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah App.) ("The existence of one or more alternate 
reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 
1996). 
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Prior supreme court decisions hold that discussions about a "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" are simply one way of restating the State's trial burden, i.e., 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 236 n. 1; State v. McClain. 
706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985); State v. Eagle. 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980).9 
But the general standard of appellate review for insufficiency claims still applies. See. 
e.g.. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 236 n.l; State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1993) 
(applying the general standard of review to a circumstantial evidence case); State v. 
James. 819 P.2d 781, 784, 789-793 (Utah 1991); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124 
(Utah 1989); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. Watts. 675 P.2d 
566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant's assertion that the State must disprove every "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" is also contradicted by recent Tenth Circuit cases. See United States v. 
Mains. 33 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Although it is possible to hypothesize 
from circumstantial evidence that another individual may have possessed the [drugs]. . . 
the evidence required to support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other 
9
 Indeed, no "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction need be given where 
"the jury is instructed that the State must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hansen. 710 
P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. McClain. 706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Burton. 642 P.2d 716, 719 (Utah 1982)); cf R. 656-658. 
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reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt") (quoting 
United States v. Parrish. 925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
In sum, the proposition that the State must disprove every reasonable alternative 
hypothesis excluding guilt is contrary to the weight of controlling authority. In any 
event, defendant has proposed no alternative hypothesis that is reasonable. 
1. The explicit alternative hypothesis presented through his only witness was 
completely discredited. Defendant's wife was his sole witness. She testified that she 
saw no hole in the wall until after the theft, that she spackled around the outlets a week 
later, and that a hole appeared after that which she again spackled (R. 1256, 1258-
1260). 
Her testimony was completely discredited. Five eyewitnesses saw the hole 
before the theft, including the two police who aimed their camera at it (R. 924-927, 
948-949, 991-992, 1083-1084, 1109-1111). Likewise, photograph's taken the day of 
the theft rebutted her suggestion that she was the one who had spackled the hole a week 
later (R. 1259; State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3). Indeed, she eventually conceded that she 
did not know who repaired the hole on the day of the theft (R. 1259-1260). 
By their verdict, it is obvious the jury rejected the testimony of defendant's wife. 
Credibility determinations are left to the trier of fact. State v. Stringham. No. 960426-
CA, slip op. at 14 (Utah App. April 23, 1998) ("We will not disturb the jury's 
credibility determinations") (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)). 
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2. Defendant's alternative "phantom thief and hole-spackler" hypothesis is 
unreasonable. Defendant also suggested a more general alternative hypothesis: that 
some unknown person entered the fitness center, walked past the front desk, went 
downstairs, entered the utility room, managed to discover the concealed surveillance 
equipment, and stole it, and that the thief (or some other unknown person) also went 
into the utility closet and tanning room, discovered the hole, and then spackled it shut 
(seeR. 1305-1316). 
While such a scenario is certainly possible, it defies "logic and reasonable 
human experience" (see Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting Workman. 852 P.2d at 
985)). Based on all the evidence, it is unreasonable to infer that an erstwhile thief, 
looking for something to steal, somehow wandered into the fitness center utility closet 
on a quiet Saturday, discovered the concealed surveillance equipment, decided to steal 
it, disconnected it, and then made off with it undetected. It is even less reasonable to 
infer that, on the very same day defendant was seen with sheetrock compound, an 
opportunistic thief (or anyone else besides defendant) patched the hole between the 
utility closet and tanning room. 
Based on the totality of evidence, defendant's alternative hypotheses are 
unreasonable. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish that the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences are so inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable 
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minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he was the thief. See Hamilton. 
827 P.2d at 235; see also R. 656. 
Point II 
THE JURY COULD REASONABLY INFER FROM PURCHASE 
PRICE AND DATE OF PURCHASE EVIDENCE THAT THE FAIR 
MARKET VALUE OF THE STOLEN EQUIPMENT EXCEEDED 
$1000.00 ON THE DAY OF THE THEFT 
Defendant argues that there "was no evidence whatsoever that the fair market 
value of the items exceeded $1,000.00" on the day of the theft (Def Br. at 15). 
Although there was no direct evidence as to fair market value, there was specific 
evidence about when the surveillance equipment was purchased and its purchase price. 
Since nine of the ten pieces of equipment were purchased within five months of the 
theft, the jury could reasonably infer that its fair market value exceeded the statutory 
minimum on the day of the theft. 
"Fair market value of the goods stolen in the area where the theft occurred is the 
standard for valuing property in theft cases. Fair market value has been defined as 
'what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer would pay to 
the true owner for the stolen item.'" State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977)); cf R. 651. 
Although a Utah court has not yet addressed the issue, other state courts have 
held that a jury may reasonably infer fair market value from the property's purchase 
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price, particularly if the property is relatively new. See Bailey County Appraisal 
District v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex.App. 1993) (jury may infer fair 
market value from property's purchase price); Dawson v. State, 360 So.2d 57, 58 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (jury may infer fair market value from purchase price and other 
circumstances); Marini v. State, 30 Md.App. 19, 351 A.2d 463, 469-470 (Md. 1976) 
(jury may infer fair market value from evidence of original purchase price 10 years 
before, replacement value to owner, and cost of tires recently placed on the car); 
People v. Paris, 182 Colo. 148, 151, 511 P.2d 893, 894 (Colo. 1973) (jury may infer 
fair market value from testimony by owner of original purchase price where goods are 
so new that purchase price and fair market value are comparable). 
The table on the following page reflects the purchase price and date of purchase 















Description of item 
Pinhole camera 





Common power strip 
VCR/recorder 
Breakout box 


























R. 1070; Exh.D-6,12 
pages 1-4 
R. 1071; Exh. D-6, 
pages 1-4 
R. 1071; Exh. D-6, 
pages 1-4 
R. 1071-1072; 
Exh. D-6, pages 1-4 
R. 1072; Exh. D-6, 
pages 1-4 
R. 1072; Exh. D-6, 
pages 1-4 
R. 1072-1073; Exh. D-
6, page 7, check # 6413 
R. 1073; Exh. D-6, 
pages 8-11 
R. 1073; Exh. D-6, 
pages 5-7, check # 6414 
R. 1073-1074; 
Exh. D-6, pages 5-7, 
check # 6414 
The total purchase price for all of the equipment was $1,257.73. 
10
 Exhibit P-l is in addendum B. 
11
 "Date of purchase" is based on evidence of actual payment (see Proof), not 
the date the item was ordered (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-106(l) and 70A-2-401 
(1997)); cf Def. Br. at 6. 
12
 Exhibit D-6 is in addendum C. 
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In order to convict defendant of third-degree felony theft, the jury had to find 
that the fair market value of the equipment exceeded $1,000.00 on 6 April 1996, the 
day of the theft (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(i) (1996)). Aside from the 
VCR, which was purchased seven years before, all of the other equipment was 
purchased within five months of the theft. In order to conclude that its fair market 
value was over $1,000.00 on 6 April 1996, the jury must have concluded that the 
equipment, as a whole, had not depreciated more than $257.72 (or just over 20%). 
Even if the jury found that the seven year-old VCR was worth only $100.00 on the day 
of the theft, that would still leave $157.72 of depreciation (or nearly 13%) for the other 
nine items which were less than five months old. Hence, based on the evidence of date 
of purchase and purchase price, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the fair 
market value of all the equipment exceeded $1,000.00 on the day of the theft. See 
Bailey County, 848 S.W.2d at 825; Dawson. 360 So.2d at 58; Marini. 351 A.2d at 
469-470; and Pans, 511 P.2d at 894. 
The jury was instructed on a lesser-included offense based on a lower value 
element (R. 641, 654), but convicted defendant as charged (R. 655-656). Their verdict 
was based on reasonable inferences from the evidence and should not be disturbed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
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State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3: 
Photographs of hole repair under the outlet 
in the tanning room of Lifephase Fitness Center 
taken the day of the theft (P-3: "4-6-96") 
STATE'S EXHIBIT P-2 
S T A T E ' S FYTTTTtTT V-1 
Addendum B 
State's Exhibit P-l: 
Diagram of surveillance equipment installed in the 
utility closet at the Lifephase Fitness Center, 
listing purchase prices on date of purchase 
(cf. table on page 29 of brief) 
t?Cy tt^L^Uc^ 
Addendum C 
Defendant's Exhibit D-1: 
Requisition forms, purchase orders, invoices, receipts, and checks 
reflecting purchase prices and dates of purchase for the surveillance equipment 
REQUISITION 
OAJ^qf*£QUisii£*r 
august i0# &9S 
AC00Uf4I 
WIIAAAPB 7640252. REQUlSmON NO. 22501 
Public Safety T&slclFQarae Aoency DEPT*EAD 
'Garth Wilkinson 
f O NUMBER 
8057 
COUNCILMAN OAAOM^ISTRATOR. SUPPLIES EQUIPMENT OATE ENCUMBERED 













\INIT L OESCpPTION 
Keyhole Camera and A c c e s s o r i e s 
1 Camera tfcdel #0C-5 









$ 1 5 9 5 . 0 2 
1. Beexpliat Give accurate descriptions 
2. Use catalog references whenever possible 
3. Give NAME ond ADDRESS of vendor 
Proposed Vendor Vendor Number 
Skaggs Telecomttmicatira Service9 Inc, 
5290 South Main S t r e e t 
Murray, Utah 84107-9797 
4. Allow sufficient time for requisition to be properly processed 
5. Copies \t 3 purchasing; copy 2 depoTlmenl 





- ^ r < S ^ ^ g g ^ 




DELIVERY DATE REQUESTED 
ITEM -QUANTITY UNIT DESCRIPTION UNIT PRICE AMOUNT 
COMMODITIES OR SERVICES FURNISHED MUST CONFORM EXACTLY TO SPECIFICATIONS 'F.O.B. UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED 
ea Keyhold Camera and Accessories 
Camera Model #CO! 
Lens 6-12 1.4VGE 
Lens H0425 
Monitor FDM-402A 
CONFIRMATION • ^ C S • O * - ^ 
$1,595*02 
s 
PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIs uhutR GIVING COST AND DELIVERY DATE 
ADDRESS ANY INQUIRIES REGARDING THIS ORDER TO: Garth Wilkinson PHONE: AX. 801 586-2950 *"* 
Q m p ' T n ^ ^ 
a m p i v-JffiP!R^-!SM^CEDAii CITY, UTAH um^?&*&&&r 
INVOIcf'Tb: &^W$&& 
ACCOUNT CODES 
| COST CODE 
7fiA0?«>? 
P.O. ISSUEO KP P.O. PAID INVOICE PAID KP >VO. • OR OATE | 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE P.O. SOX 24» 
R : CEOAR CITY, UTAH 84720 * * ^ * 
STATE OF UTAH SALES OR USE TAX 
EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE *> 
I hereby certify thtt commodities included In 
this order .will be used in an essential 
governmental function and are exempt from 
State of Utah Sales and Use Taxes. 
Exemption No. 5440110039 




pdRCHASlNG AOtNT ^ 
INVOICE 
Skaggs Telecommunications Service 
5290 Sou* M«n P.O Box 57560 
Murray. Utth 84107 Murray. UUh 84157 
Pho^^WM^-4400 
FAX (801) 261-1580 
BILL TO IRON/BEAVER DRIG TASK FORCE 
BOX 861 
CEDAR CITY, W 84720 
8 0 1 / 5 8 6 - 2 6 5 1 USA 
INVOICE N U M B E R 9 5 - 5 4 7 2 9 2 
CUSTOMER NO 4 7 2 4 7 6 






























Net 30 Days 1 
SERIAL NUMBER 
STATUS EP 
FAILURE CODE TQ EST TIME SS DATE SERIAL NUMBER MAKE MODEL STATUS EP 
THIS ORDER WAS SIGNED FOR BY GARTO WILKINSON ON 10-20-95 


















CAMERA, 1/2" HIGH RES. 527890 BJF 
LENS, 6-12mm VARIABLE FOCAL AUTO-IRIS BJF 
LENS, COMPUTAR 4.0MM MAN A0259 BJF 
MONITOR, 4" FLAT DISPLAY A0260 BJF 
ADAPTER, 2X LENS BJF 
CABLE, UNIVERSAL ADAPTER (FDM-402A) BJF 
MOUNT, MAGNET BASE FLEX BJF 
MOUNT, SPRING CLIP BASE BJF 
DETECTOR, SMOKE DETECTOR CAMERA FIX BJF 
IWEKTER AC/DC 125 WATTS BJF 
CABLE, AUTO POWER ADAPTER BJF 
CABLE, AC ADAPTER FOR (FDM-402A) BJF 
ADAPTER, 3 OUTLET FOR AUTO BJF 








































CCSH^II CJ ft K 
Skaggs Telecommunications Service 
5290 South Main • P.O. Box 57560 
Murray, Utan 84)07 • San LaHa C*y. Utah 84157 
Phone (801) 261-4400 
_.,.
 T f ) IRON/GARFIELD CQUNTYS NARCOTICS BILL IU
 T f t S K F Q R C E 
P 0 BOX 861 












INVOICE PAYMENT | INVOICE J PAYMENT J 
1 ACCOUNT NO. 
J 572476 
DATE ~] 
i 1/21/95 1 
Skaggs Telecommunications Service 
5290 Sooth Mam . P.O Boi 57560 
Murray Utah 64107 • Sail Lake City. Utah 64157 
Phone (801) 261-4400 
STATEMENT 
DATE INVOICE P.O./CONTRACT NUMBER REFERENCE CHARGES PAYMENTS BALANCE 
*** PAYMENTS *** 
.••sfi.«l 
OPEN INVOICES **•• 
A5S963 1692.72 
CURRENT 30 Days 60 Davs «0 Devs 120 Days LATE CHARGES AMOUNT DUE 
0. 00 0. 00 0,00 
IF YQU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ON SERV 
DP BILLING CALL 284-4765 
ON PAST DUE ACCOUNTS CALL DIANN AT 
f/MMf YOU FOR PAYING PROMPTLY 
t . 5 0 0 % per Month Will Be 
Added To Unoaid Amounts 
DATE PAID AMOUNT PAID 
fiEQUISmON 
OATEOf REQUISITION 
November 29 ;*? 95] 
ACCOUNT 
NUMBER: 7640252 REQUISITION NO. 22516 
DEPAKTM^T 
Public Safety Task Force Agency 
DEPT HEAD 
Garcn wiiKinson 
f 0 NUMBER 
8057 















| "UNIT "tjfSCTlPTION* 
Box; Breakout Audio/Video Power 
: Cable,'12" Pigtail for Sony (sale oonn) 
Cable, 12* Pigtail for Sony (Fenale Conn) 
•c^U. '-V/JAT .1 









1. Be explicit Give accurate descriptions 
2. Use catalog references whenever possible 
3. Give NAME and ADDRESS of vendor 
Proposed Vendor Vendor Number. 
Skaggs Telecxatminication Service, Inc. 
5290 South Main Street 
Murray, Utah 84107-9797 
4. Allow sufficient time for requisition to be properly processed 
5. Copies 1, 3 purchasing; copy 2 department 




NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO BUY WITHOUT A PURCHASE ORDER 
DEPARTMENT FILE 
£ 
SALES / SERVICE ORDER 
Skaggs Telecommunications Service 
8290 Soutt Main PX>.BOK57560 
Muray. Utah 84107 Murray. Utah 84157 
flhona (801) 261-4400 
SO NUMBER 95 -5^76* 
CUSTOMER NO. 4714781 
PAGE NO. 1 OF I 
BILLTO: *1W WMW hfVW&M Iron/Garfiel<§H.P?c£Cotics Task Force 
PPW-/W&// P.O. Box 861 




























• ; / . RELEASED •.•/.•..•: 
/ _ . . / _ _ - _ 
*>¥t&jtomsta&8&m 
C. 0 . 0 . 
* ^ l S f f l ^ f f l § E ? M S I 
'. . ;STAT0Sf. •M&S&gL 















^ BOX, BREAKOUT AU0I0/VIDE0/P0WER BJF 
/» CABLE, 12" PIGTAIL FOR SONY (male conn. BJF 
if CABLE, 12" PIGTAIL FOR S0NY(female conn BJF 
Al when o rde r i ng the v k - l p g you have to 
s p e c i f y male or female connec tors . 






Thanks fo r your business. 
YOUR SIGNATURE S AN OFFER TO PURCHASE f » produces m o w aarvfeas iflad aDova a r t * . If aecaplad by STS. tic.. « • ba a purchaaa 
eontad « • r » larma and oondriore on t* m n e haraol hobdhg warranty M m n and imttoom of STS, h e iabiity » * adowrtarjgad 
tu l anyarjipmart M l o w rimy dayi torn dawof raparnxinylatonandeuaBmarnooftcjton may bi«otdBcoxr 1» coasof aMdrapaira 








FUND CEDAR CITY CORPORATION 
P.O. BOX 249 . 801-686-2950 
CEDAR CITY, UT 84721 
01-68 2 S J CEDAR CTTY OFFICE • TEL. 5664456 
j h STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
S H P.O. BOX 340 • CEDAR CTTY. UTAH W721-0340 6413 
C.EC»AR;.pl7V 







STATE OF UTAH - ITS TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
State Office Building, Room 6000 





VARRANTB" I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS WARRANT 6 ISSUED AOOORDNG TO LAW AND 6 WITHN THE DEBfT UMTT 
OF CEDAR OTY.UTAH 
i f o o & u i a n 1 1:121*30177^1: 0 i q a i ? & 
FUbLiC SAFETY TASK FORCE 
FUND CEDAR CITY CORPORATION 01-88 
P.O. BOX 249 801-586-2950 
CEDAR CITY, UT 84721 
CEOAR CTTY OFFICE • TEL. 5864456 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
P.O. BOX 540 • CEOAR CTTY, UTAH 64721-0340 






SKAGGS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 
5290 South Main Street 




I HERE^/CERTVY & A T THIS WARRAOTBT&UQ) 
ACCORDING TO LAW AND IS WITHIN THE DEBfT LMT 
OF CEDAR CTTY. UTAH 
tEQUISITION 
[DATE Of REQUISITION 
January 1 8 , 1989 19 
ACCOUNT 
NUMBER „
 M0>.^ 76-4212-740 
DEPART MENT 
I Public Safety Task Force Agency 
REQUISITION NO. 10701 
D€PT. HEAD 
Garth VJilfcinson 
COUNOlMAN OR ADMINISTRATOR SUPPLIES EQUIPMENT 
9.0. NUMBER 1 
6600 
















Samsung 13M Color TV 






2 8 8 . 0 0 
144 .95 
1. Be explicit. Give accurate descriptions 
2. Use catalog references whenever possible 
3. Give NAME and ADDRESS of vendor 
Proposed Vendor Vendor Number 
Inkley*s 
162 N. Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 04720 
4. Allow sufficient time for requisition to be properly processes 
5. Copies 1, 3 purchasing; copy 2 department 
Authorized Signature ^J&-*&^tZfcj A ^ ^ ^ ^ W * * - * ^ -
Recorder \ f f l ^ U v Q J ''JfiU* 
City AAanagec<£^£2^L 
Controller 
NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO BUY WITHOUT A PURCHASE ORDER 
DEPARTMENT FILE 
DI 13 
SALT LAKE CITY • COTTONWOOD • SANDY • MIOVALE • BOUNTIFUL • LAYTON • ROY • RIVEROALE • OGOEN • LOGAN • ST. GEORGE • VERNAL • PRICE • CEDAR CITY 
PRESTON • POCATELLO • BLACK FOOT • IDAHO FALLS - TWIN FALLS * BURLEY • REXBURG - ROCK SPRINGS • EVANSTON • ELKO 
( MAIN OFFICE: 1984 SO. STATE ST. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64115 » (SOI) 486-5901") 
SOLD { C t' / / ' . \ %£7?l < J i ^ B , L L 
ADDRESS _ _ _ _ _ 
PHONE. 
ACCOUNT NUMBER P.O. # 
^^oo 
AUTHORIZATION I N V O I C E N U M B E R INVOICE NUMBER DATE I SLSPN'S NO.^ 
^«3iiACrNMikaEii;;^^pQ^^ :1.«HR9OTM.'; f - / ^- • -L. SKU# CLASS DEP. QY. 
/ 
j > r > , - ^ _ . i 
CONDITION OF SALE: TITLE TC MERCHANDISE HEREIN REMAINS WITH THE SELLER 
UNTIL ACCOUNT PAID IN FULL IF COLLECTION IS MADE BY SUIT OR OTHERWISE THE 
PURCHASER AGREES TO PAY INTEREST UNTIL PAID IN FULL ALSO COLLECTION COST 
INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE 
FINANCE CHARGE: If a F-nance Charge <s due i.s you sha» pay FINANCE CHARGE of 1.75H 
per mcnih (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE: 21°*) on the balance of your account dur-ng the billing 
perioc as descnbec below A minimum monthly FINANCE CHARGE cf 50c wii be charged any 










AMOUNT ^ ] 
INKLEYS CEDAR CITY 
162N.MAIN £T. -
3HONE 536-9963 
31/13/89 TICKET# 38-1952 SLSMN 1 1 
BUSINESS CHARGE SALE 
274596 144.95 MERCHDISE 
2756.15 v» c a 288.06 MERCHD! SE 
.30 TAX 
432.95 TOTAL SALE 
ACCOUNT #166302 
THANK YOU « 
PURCHASE ORDER 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION 
P.O. BOX 249 
CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84720 
PURCHASE ORDER 
No. 006600 
• MUST SHOW ON ALL INVOICES 
DELIVERY TO BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
DATE:. January 23, 1989 INQUIRY NO. 1 9 . 
REQUISITION NO.. m?m 
r INKLEY'S 
162 N. Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
VENDOR NO. 
DELIVER TO . 
SHIP VIA 
DELIVERY DATE REQUESTED. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO VENDOR 
1. INVOICING: INVOICES MUST BE RENDERED IN DUPLICATE for tech ord»f 
•nd lent to the ACCOUNTS PAYABLE. 
REFERENCE: PURCHASE tORDER ^NUMBER sMJST 
~***N VOICES, p*cfc«9«s, tfrtt «y «Bp» end corrtspotMfeoce. 
3. PREPAY AND ADD TO INVOICE. 
4. For local pickups obtain signature ol receiver on invoice. 
TERMS: 
ITEM QUANTITY UNIT DESCRIPTION UNIT PRICE AMOUNT 






Samsung 13" Color TV 
$288.00 
144.95 
PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER GIVING COST AND DELIVERY DATE 
ADDRESS ANY INQUIRIES REGARDING THIS ORDER TO: 6afth WilkinSOB PHONE: AC. M l 586-6514 




COUNTS PAYABLE P.O. BOK 249 
ED All CITY, UTAH 9*12X> r 
1 COST COOE 
7fi-A?12-740 
PO ISSUED KP PO PAID INVOICE PAID KP VO. • OH DATE STATE OF UTAH SALES OR USE TAX 
EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that commodities included in 
this order will be used in an essential 
governmental function and are exempt from 
State of Utah Sales and Use Taxes. 
Exemption No. 5440110039 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION 
CITY MANAGER 
DEPARTMENT COPY 
B T . 
PURCHASING AGENT 
